The short answer
Corporate groups, most of them backed by private equity, now own a large share of U.S. veterinary practices, with one 2025 estimate putting it at about 30% of general practices and 75% of specialty and emergency practices. In the sources used here, comparisons of the two models come from trade columnists and from one perspective paper whose authors work with independent practices. Those sources describe tradeoffs: corporate groups should in theory gain scale and access to capital, while independent practices keep autonomy and associates and owners in independent practices report better workplace satisfaction. Acquisition activity and sale prices dropped sharply after 2021 as interest rates rose, and the Federal Trade Commission has placed conditions on at least one large buyer of specialty and emergency clinics.
Key takeaways
- Writing in Today's Veterinary Business in 2025, Bob Lester cited an Antelligence database count of 9,500 corporate practices, set against a Census Bureau estimate of 32,634 U.S. veterinary establishments [2].
- A 2025 Frontiers in Veterinary Science perspective paper stated that corporate consolidators own roughly 75% of specialty and emergency practices and 25% of primary care practices, which together represent half of national veterinary revenue [1].
- Citing Idexx data, consultant Ryan Leech reported in 2023 that acquisitions of independent practices fell 68%, from 1,550 in 2021 to an estimated 500 in 2023 [3].
- Leech described offers near 18 times EBITDA as a temporary spike, with multiples moving back toward 8 to 13 times [3].
- In June 2022 the FTC required JAB Consumer Partners to divest clinics as a condition of buying SAGE Veterinary Partners and, separately, the parent company of Ethos [4][5].
- The Frontiers authors cited a Veterinary Management Groups survey of former owners who sold to corporations, in which 71% said they would have preferred to sell to an associate [1].
How far consolidation has gone
Market-share figures differ depending on the source and the year, so each one should be read alongside its origin. In his 2025 column, Lester wrote that corporations own about 30% of general practices, that those practices account for 50% of primary care revenue, and that corporations operate 75% of specialty and emergency practices [2]. The Frontiers paper, drawing on a 2022 Brakke Consulting industry overview, gave 25% for primary care practices and 75% for specialty and emergency practices. It described the combined total as "50% of nationwide veterinary revenues" [1]. The two sources therefore agree on specialty and emergency care. They differ by about five points on general practice and describe the 50% revenue figure differently.
The Frontiers authors describe rapid market consolidation. Citing a 2018 JAVMA article, they wrote that corporate practices made up about 10% of general companion animal practices in 2017 [1]. They date the start of the corporate era to VCA's first clinic purchase more than 30 years ago [1].
| Measure | Figure | Source and year |
|---|
| U.S. veterinary establishments | 32,634 (Census Bureau estimate) | Lester, 2025 [2] |
| Corporate practices | 9,500 (Antelligence database) | Lester, 2025 [2] |
| Corporate share of general practices | about 30% | Lester, 2025 [2] |
| Corporate share of primary care practices | about 25% | Frontiers paper citing Brakke 2022 [1] |
| Corporate share of specialty and emergency | 75% | Lester, 2025 [2]; Frontiers [1] |
| Corporate share of general companion animal practices, 2017 | about 10% | Frontiers paper citing JAVMA 2018 [1] |
Who buys practices and why owners sell
According to the Frontiers authors, most corporate groups today have private equity backing. These investors are not publicly traded, typically buy businesses they believe can be run more efficiently, and later sell them at a profit. The owners are usually not veterinarians [1]. Lester wrote that the money comes from pension funds, teacher unions, university endowments, large institutions and accredited investors [2]. He summarized their reasoning as seeing a fragmented, recession-resistant field that grows faster than GDP [2]. He also pointed to rising pet ownership, citing 87 million U.S. households with a pet, or 66%, compared with 56% in 1988 [2].
Lester divides consolidation into three phases. In the first, "land-grab" buyers purchase hospitals and resell them as bundles within three to five years and put little money into them. Middle-phase investors hold practices longer and spend more on recruiting, culture and equipment. Late-phase strategic owners intend to stay [2]. He named Mars (Banfield, VCA, BluePearl) and JAB (Compassion First, National Veterinary Associates) as the only two large U.S. strategic players so far, and placed the profession in "the later middle innings" [2].
On the seller side, the Frontiers paper reported results from a Veterinary Management Groups survey of former members who sold to corporations. In that survey, 47% wanted to capture high multiples, 71% would have preferred to sell to an associate, and 59% said the associate could not afford the purchase [1]. This is unpublished survey data held on file by a group that works with independent practices, and the paper gives no sample size.
Valuations and deal volume since 2021
Leech attributed the slowdown to two causes. The first was Federal Reserve rate increases, which pushed rates to a 22-year high and made debt more expensive for acquirers. The second was NVA dropping its planned IPO while the FTC delayed its Ethos acquisition, after which NVA lowered the multiples it was offering [3]. He added that as veterinary visits reverted to pre-COVID numbers, hospital revenue declined and, with it, hospital values [3]. The Frontiers authors, citing Brakke Consulting, wrote that high multiples have been declining since 2022 [1]. Lester wrote that investment slowed as rates rose. He also noted that no significant-sized veterinary practice company has traded on public markets since VCA sold to Mars in 2017, and he expects that to change [2].
The Frontiers authors argue that higher rates hurt private equity more than independents, because the private equity model relies on cheap borrowing. They also expect corporate buyers to regain that advantage once rates fall [1]. Leech wrote that consolidators now need to improve the margins of practices they already own instead of relying on resale arbitrage [3].
Reported differences between ownership models
Lester is chief medical officer at WellHaven Pet Health and a founding member of Banfield Pet Hospital, which he identifies as Mars-owned. He wrote that consolidators should in theory hold advantages in scale, leverage, benefits, career paths, managerial expertise and capital. He identified their possible weaknesses as reduced medical autonomy and putting profit first. He credited independents with autonomy, flexibility and less bureaucracy [2]. He concluded that both models include good and weaker practices and that most of each are good [2].
The Frontiers paper cites a study of associates (Kogan and Rishniw, JAVMA 2023). In that study 55.1% preferred independent practice, even though about 70% of respondents worked in corporate settings [1]. Per the paper, corporate associates reported more pressure to see clients and generate revenue. Insurance, continuing education and mental wellness programs were more common in corporate practices, while independent associates were more satisfied with administration, mentorship, culture, compensation and turnover [1]. The paper does not report that study's sample size or limitations, and the full study is not among the sources here. Citing AVMA and Merck Animal Health data, the paper also reports that 21% of corporate medical directors experienced high or very high burnout. By contrast, independent practice owners were the group most likely to report low burnout. Separately, the paper reports that independent owners had 84% job satisfaction [1].
The same authors list weaknesses of independent practices. These include lacking economies of scale, slow adoption of technology, underuse of practice managers and credentialed technicians, and missing mission statements. They report that 46.7% of independent practices have no vision or mission statement [1]. They also flag access to capital as possibly the largest threat to independents [1].
Federal antitrust action on specialty and emergency clinics
In June 2022 the FTC required JAB Consumer Partners to divest clinics in California and Texas as a condition of its $1.1 billion purchase of SAGE Veterinary Partners [4]. The agency alleged that the combined firm would be the only provider in some of the affected markets [4]. Under that order, JAB needs "the Commission's prior approval" to buy a specialty or emergency clinic within 25 miles of a JAB-owned clinic in California or Texas. It must also give 30 days' written notice for such deals nationwide when they are not otherwise reportable under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, and these terms last 10 years [4].
Later that month, the FTC conditioned JAB's $1.65 billion acquisition of Ethos's parent company on the sale of five clinics in Richmond, the Washington, D.C. area, Denver and near San Francisco. Prior-approval requirements applied in California, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Maryland and Virginia for 10 years [5]. The agency noted that it had also ordered divestitures in JAB's earlier $5 billion purchase of NVA [5]. The Commission voted 5-0 on both complaints [4][5].
Limits of the available evidence
The Frontiers article is a perspective piece, not a study. Three of its four authors disclose ties to Vetbooks and Veterinary Management Groups and say they "work with and support independent veterinary practitioners" [1]. Lester is chief medical officer at WellHaven Pet Health and a founding member of Banfield [2]. Leech previously held roles at several veterinary businesses [3]. In our read, none of these sources is neutral, so we attribute each position to its author. The cited sources do not contain a direct U.S. comparison of prices or quality of care by ownership type.
